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Judicial independence is one leg of the
three-legged stool that comprises our system
of government. Without it, the system topples.
So far, so good; most people would agree with
to that proposition. Now comes the rub: What
is judicial independence; how should we identify
those individuals whom we choose to uphold
the duties of an independent judiciary; and what
obligations do judges have once appointed?
Judicial independence is not political rhetoric;
rather, it is a state of mind that is ever-present in
the deliberative process of a good judge. Judges
have a preeminent obligation to perform the duties
of their offices impartially, and to address each
case on its merits. In Colorado, Canon 3 of the
state's Code of Judicial Conduct demands that
a "judge should be faithful to the law and ... be
unswayed by partisan interest, public clamor, or
fear of criticism.", In service of that impartiality,
a judge "should abstain from public comment
about a pending or impending proceeding in
any court. ' 2 Indeed, the whole purpose of the
judiciary in our tripartite system of government is
independence from the other two branches: so as
to maintain a nation ruled by laws, not by men; a
nation in which minority interests and the rights
of individual citizens find protection even in the
face of societal pressures; and, a nation in which
equality and justice for all is a reality.
I. Judicial Independence: Its History
The concept of a judiciary beholden to no one
is fairly new, historically speaking. In medieval
England, judges were anything but independent.
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They were servants of the crown,
who served at the pleasure of
the crown. They enforced the will
of the sovereign-whatever he
or she might from time to time
decree. In 1215, the Magna Carta
announced the first substantial
step toward a rule of law by
declaring, "We [will not] proceed
against or prosecute him [a
free man], except by the lawful
judgment of his peers and by the
law of the land."3 The notion of a
rule of law was the first step, and
a necessary one, toward judicial
independence, and away from
the expectation that the judge
was the delegate of the crown or
of some other body, enforcing the
will of that authority-not the rule
of law.
In 1608, one of the first crises
of judicial independence occurred
when James I sought to take
cases away from the judges of
England and decide them himself.
In declining that request, Lord
Coke wrote:
[C]auses which concern
the life, or inheritance, or
goods, or fortunes of his
[Majesty's] subjects, are not
to be decided by natural
reason but by the artificial
reason and judgment of law,
which.., requires long study
and experience... that the
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law was the golden met-
wand and measure to try the
causes of the subjects.
4
The concept of judicial
independence was brought to
the colonies-and here amplified.
In 1780, when John Adams put
the phrase "a government of
laws and not of men" into the
Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights,5 he was anchoring that
tradition. Nevertheless, the
creation of a tripartite system
of government, in which the
courts and their judges were an
equal and balanced part, was an
evolution of the rule of law and an
inspiration.
John Adams argued in 1776
that "judicial power ought to be
distinct from both the legislative
and executive, and independent
upon both, that so it may be a
check upon both. ' 6 Adams did
not want judges dependent upon
any man or body of men for their
salaries or their offices.
However, there was clearly an
opposing view. Many of the early
state constitutions made judges
dependent on the legislature or
electorate-by way of term limits,
elections, or removal by the
legislature. Jefferson said in 1776
that, in relation to legislatures,
judges should be "mere
machine[s]. ' 7 Between 1776 and
1787, Adams's viewpoint prevailed
and by 1787, even Jefferson
lobbied for independence in the
face of a rising fear of "legislative
despotism."8
The Ninth Resolution of
the Virginia delegation to the
Constitutional Convention stated
an intention to establish a national
judiciary who would hold their
offices during good behavior-
ultimately accompanied by a
provision that salaries could be
increased, but not decreased,
during a judge's tenure.9 Thus
was born our flagship of judicial
independence: the federal
judiciary. The controversy
surrounding that decision reflects
the fact that judicial independence
is, admittedly, contrary to the
notion of majority rule and to
accountability. An independent
judiciary sometimes concludes
that an act of Congress is
unconstitutional, or that the tide
of public opinion is-however
strong- nonetheless wrong.
II. Does it matter?
Justice Aharon Barak, the
President of the Israeli Supreme
Court, spoke about the meaning
of democracy and the role of an
independent judiciary as follows:
"[M]ajority rule [can infringe]
upon the rule of law and the
independence of the judiciary;
majority rule [can infringe] upon
human rights-majority rule of
this kind violates the notion of
democracy."10 At one time, he
noted, we might have believed
that respect for basic principles
"could be guaranteed by relying
on self-restraint of the majority.""1
But history shows otherwise: "In
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many regimes, the majority [has
been] ready to abuse its full
power in order to violate values,
principles, and human rights
which stood in its way.
' 12
Judicial independence has
been a vehicle for the curbing
of excesses of other branches of
government over the years-on
a case-by-case, deliberate, and
precedent-bound basis. The
courts gave the protections of
the First Amendment life; the
courts gave voice and forum to
the tension between federalism
and states' rights; the courts
enforced school integration,
permitted slaves to own property,
and curbed some of the excesses
took judges out of partisan
elections was spearheaded by
a group of citizens. Under our
system, judicial nominating
commissions accept applications
for each judicial vacancy. They
meet, review the applications,
call references, interview the
candidates, and nominate two to
three (normally three) candidates.
The nominating commissions
consist of either thirteen or
seven members (thirteen for the
statewide commission and seven
for district commissions). The
commissions are comprised of
a majority of non-lawyers, with
not more than one-half being
members of the same political
years depending upon when the
next general election will occur.
At that time, he or she will be
on the ballot for a general "yes/
no" vote from the electorate. If
retained, Supreme Court justices
serve ten-year terms; court of
appeals judges serve eight-year
terms; district court judges, six;
and, county court judges, four.13
In 1988, Colorado implemented
a statewide system of judicial
performance evaluation in
order to assist voters in making
decisions about whether to retain
a particular judge. Colorado was
the second state in the nation to
establish such a program. The
judicial performance commissions
Of the seven Colorado Supreme Court Justices, three are women. Significantly, a
woman is the presiding Chief Justice. The Justices are as follows: Chief Justice Mary
J. Mularkey, Justice Rebecca Love Kourlis, and Justice Nancy E. Rice.
Colorado Judicial Branch Website, Judges of the Court of Appeals,
http://www.courts.state.co.us/coalcoajudges.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2003).
of the McCarthy era. Without a
judiciary independent of the other
two branches of government,
those fundamental steps toward




As distinct from the federal
system, each state has a
judicial system that represents
its own answer to the tension
between accountability and
independence. In Colorado, since
1966, we have had a modified
Missouri Plan for the selection
and retention of judges. The
constitutional amendment that
party. The Governor, Attorney
General, and Chief Justice, in a
collaborative process, appoint
the lawyer members. The
Governor appoints the non-lawyer
members. After receipt of the
nominees from the commission,
the Governor has fifteen days to
decide which of the nominees he
wishes to choose for the position.
His staff consults various sources
to obtain information on the
candidates, and frequently the
Governor interviews the nominees
as well.
Once the Governor chooses
a judge, that person serves a
provisional term of two to three
consist of ten members-again, a
majority of non-lawyers. The Chief
Justice, the Governor, the Speaker
of the House, and the President of
the Senate appoint the members.
Evaluation of a particular judge
takes place through the use
of survey questionnaires sent
to lawyers, trial court judges,
litigants, probation officers,
social services, court personnel,
and law enforcement agencies.
The commissions review the
information about the judges
and then interview the judges
individually. The commissions
then issue a "retain" or "do not
retain" recommendation, coupled
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with a biographical statement
about the judge and a brief
compilation of comments about
the judge.
The judicial performance
commissions have two real
benefits: first, they provide the
voters with information about the
judges on the ballot; and second,
they give the judges themselves
feedback about how they are
viewed by the people whose
lives they impact. Beginning in
1998, information about judges
from the judicial performance
commissions is included in the
"blue book" distributed to all
electors. For the first time in 2001,
the General Assembly approved
significant funding for judicial
performance commissions-for
an objective, professional survey
and the accumulation of important
input on judges.14
Other states have a variety
of systems, which range from
straight elective systems to
appointive systems more akin
to Colorado. Some states
differentiate between appellate
judges and trial court judges, with
the trial court judges subject to
election and the appellate judges
subject to appointment. Other
states have term limits for judges,
capping the period of time that a
judge may serve on a particular
bench, or even in the judiciary.
With that brief overview of the
federal system and the Colorado
system, I return to the "hot topic"
of judicial independence-a
source of controversy, both
systemically and ideologically.
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centers on political attempts to
erode judicial independence-
such as Congress's consideration
of a bill that would allow it to
overrule the Supreme Court, or
talk of putting state judges back
into an electoral system in states
that have retention systems. Those
changes would be dramatic, and I
certainly would not state that they
could not occur. They could, and
it behooves all of us to be vigilant
and vocal.
However, the more
pervasive challenges to judicial
independence are ideological.
The clearest example of corrosion
of judicial independence can
be seen in partisan elections.1
5




for judicial office are asked to
express their views on issues
that will necessarily come before
them if they are chosen to fill
the position-issues such as
domestic abuse, drunk driving,
victim's rights, and criminal
defendant's rights. It is a delicate
matter for those candidates
or applicants to express those
views in generalities while still
preserving the ability to hear
individual cases without being
rightfully accused of having
prejudged the outcome.
Similarly, in an Alabama
Supreme Court election, the
state democratic party ran an
ad calling for a vote against
"Alabama's Republican Supreme
Court" because the court had
ruled for binding arbitration in the
Firestone tire cases, rather than
allow trial by jury.16 The Michigan
Republican State Committee
recently ran an ad not authorized
by any candidate, but which
accused a judge of being "[w]eak
on gun crime [and] wrong for the
court," as the party contended
that the judge had wrongly
reversed over fifty criminal
convictions.1 7 A Georgia Supreme
Court justice's opponent was
cited by the Judicial Qualifications
Commission for using false,
deceptive, and misleading tactics
by distributing a flier that called
the justice a "judicial extremist"
and accused her of "referr[ing]
[sic] to traditional moral standards
as pathetic and disgraceful. ' 8
The United States Supreme
Court opinion in Republican Party
v. White 9 complicates the matter
even further for candidates
seeking a judgeship in a state that
holds elections. The Court recently
decided that the "announce
clause" in the Minnesota Code of
Judicial Conduct, which prevents
a candidate seeking judicial office
from "announcing their views on
disputed legal or political issues,"
is unconstitutional .20  Clearly,
public pressure in those states will
now be exerted to force judges
to announce their positions on
a variety of issues.21 How can
a judge exercise the necessary
impartiality after having declared
in the election process that he or
she holds a particular ideology
toward certain issues or types of
cases?
Of course, there are also all
of the problems associated with
fund-raising in judicial elections.
Overall, in 2000, state supreme
court candidates raised $45.6
million-a 61% increase over
1998.22 Not surprisingly, but
certainly of concern, is the fact that
Volume 80 Issue 4
analyses have shown that at least
half of those political donations
come from lawyers and business
interests.23  These problems
have become blatantly evident
in Texas. On that point, a recent
study indicated that individuals
congressional leaders threatened
to initiate impeachment
proceedings if the judge did not
reverse his ruling27 The President
also suggested that he might
request the judge's resignation
if the ruling was not changed.
28
political parties, why now are we
infecting the judiciary with those
very same ills?
V. Judicial Selection
If we accept the premise that
an independent judiciary is a
good thing, then how should
Four women currently sit on the Colorado Court of Appeals: Chief Judge Janice B.
Davidson, Judge Sandra I. Rothenberg, Judge JoAnn L. Vogt, and Judge Marsha M.
Piccone. Coincidentally, Judge Vogt attended the University of Denver College of Law
(J.D. '86). The total number of judges on the Court of Appeals is 16.
Colorado Judicial Branch Website, Judges of the Court of Appeals,
http://www.courts.state.co.uslcoalcoajudges.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2003).
or entities who contributed to
the justices' campaigns had an
almost 400% better chance of
having their petitions for certiorari
granted.2 4 Of the 442 petitions the
court accepted, 70% involved at
least one petitioning party who
was a contributor.25
However, the corrosion of
judicial independence is not
limited to states with elective
systems. Threats of recall and
impeachment have also made it
increasingly difficult for judges
to act independently in the face
of opposition. Over the last few
years, numerous judges have
been subject to great criticism by
elected officials, the press, and
the public for their decisions in
particular cases.
For example, in 1996, a federal
district court judge in New York
ordered the suppression of
evidence that he found to have
been seized in an "unreasonable"
search, within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. 26 While
the prosecution's motion for
reconsideration was pending,
The judge granted the motion to
reconsider, allowing the evidence
to be admitted.2 9 Similarly, a
superior court judge from
California faced a recall effort
based on the decision to award
child custody to O.J. Simpson
after he was acquitted of murder
charges.30 The group also
criticized the judge for awarding
partial custody to a woman
who later killed her children and
herself.3 The judge defended
her decisions as based on the
law, but the group countered,
accusing her of having "blood on
her hands. '32 And, in Tennessee,
state Supreme Court Justice
Penny White was removed from
the bench after she concurred
with a majority decision to vacate
a death sentence.33
In a time when we are
increasingly dismayed by the
impact of fund-raising upon our
political candidates; when we
worry about the leverage exerted
by special interest groups or by
lobbying efforts; and when we
bemoan the balkanization of the
we go about identifying those
individuals who could serve as
independent judges? Also, how
realistic is it to argue that elected
officials should be non-partisan in
this effort?
Perhaps the place to begin is by
creating a list of factors that most
people would agree good judges
should share. Those factors might
consist of impartiality, industry,
integrity, professional skills,
community contacts, and social
awareness. For appellate judges,
one might add collegiality and
writing ability; and for trial judges,




A good judge is not necessarily
one who shares the political
views of the appointing authority;
and most definitely, a good judge
is not someone who is willing to
prejudge an issue and express
an opinion about how he or she
might vote on a case that might
come before that court.
Why not? Why are we not, as a
society, entitled to have a judiciary
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that reflects the general morays
of the public? The mere posing of
the question suggests the answer.
Judges should not be swayed
by public opinion, and certainly
should not conform their views to
the majority or to the appointing
authority's expectations once
sworn into the office. Indeed,
once the judge takes the bench,
he or she is sworn to uphold the
Constitution and the laws-not
to conform decisions to the will
of the majority. Any generalized
attempt to force or induce a judge
to express an opinion about
a topic or case that will come
before the court risks that judge's
ultimate impartiality.
Furthermore, efforts to appoint
partisan judges or judges who
come to the bench with a particular
bent of mind are shortsighted.
First of all, those individuals may
not, indeed, vote as predicted.
Second, if one party succeeds in
individual in the business of
choosing judges should be
concerned with whether that
person can apply the law in a
fair and impartial manner on a
case-by-case basis. As for trial
court judge positions, the inquiry
should center on whether the
individual can truly be impartial,
whether he or she can manage a
courtroom, handle the work load,
treat everyone in the courtroom
with respect, and whether he
or she has the industry and
intelligence to become fully
acquainted with the legal issues.
Trial judges seldom rule on the
constitutionality of a statute or
decide issues that have policy
implications.
Appellate judges sometimes
deal with broader issues and,
therefore, the inquiry of those
applicants is necessarily broader.
Toward that end, maybe the
questions appellate judicial
legislative intent?
4) Do you know what your
biases are, and can you
overcome them?
5) Do you have a particular
ideological bent that would
prevent you from judging each
case before you fairly and
impartially, based upon the
facts of that case?
6) Absent a statute, what is the
role of the courts in determining
the law?
I certainly do not mean to
imply that determining whether
someone can be a good and
fair judge is an easy task. I do
think that frank and wide-ranging
interviews, an analysis of that
individual's writing and opinions
(if any), and input from those
with whom the individual has
had professional contact are all
very valuable. What I advocate
here is that the decision-maker,
be it the Governor in Colorado,
the President, or a United States
The Colorado Judicial Branch is comprised of 256 Judges and Justices: 7 Supreme Court
Justices, 16 Court of Appeals Judges, 132 District Court Judges, and 101 County Court
Judges. This excludes Denver County Court Judges, of which there are 17, who are
appointed independently by the Mayor of Denver.
Colorado Judicial Branch Website, Court Facts, http://www.courts.state.co.us/exec/pubed
courtfactspage.htm (last visited Apr 20, 2003).
securing a series of appointees
supportive of one ideology, the
next time the other party comes
into power, it will do the same.
The battle is unending and
counter-productive. Better by far
to focus on choosing individuals
who will serve with intelligence
and integrity-individuals who
can uphold the honor of an
independent judiciary.
Accordingly, in my view, every
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applicants should answer are Senator, should be concerned
questions such as: with finding wise, smart, careful,
1) Under what circumstances, if
any, do you believe precedent
should be over-turned?
2) What do you think the role
of the courts is in interpreting
legislation?
3) Do you think that the
language of a statute or
legislative intent is more
important if the two conflict?
Where would you look to find
thoughtful, and fair people who
can uphold the independence
of the judiciary with honor and
integrity.
Lastly, I caution that we are
"playing with fire" in this area.
The judiciary is a very vulnerable
branch of government that
depends entirely upon public trust
and confidence for its authority. If
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judges are perceived as being
unfair, political, or biased, the
system begins to erode. We must
remember how important both
fairness and the appearance of
fairness are to confidence in the
courts. People only trust courts
and our system of justice to the
extent that they genuinely believe
that they will be treated fairly. We
cannot afford to undermine that
perception in the process by
which judges are selected. The
independence of the judiciary is
a hallowed and pivotal part of
our system of government. It is
critical to the system of checks
and balances that we enjoy as a
nation-and as a state. If we, as a
society, can encourage respect for
our rule of law and for our courts,
we promote respect for authority
and for society in general. We do
so in part by supporting selection
processes that designate the
most impartial, independent,
and thoughtful individuals as our
judges. Those judges, in turn,
bear the heavy responsibility of
deserving that independence.
VI. After the Appointment:
Then What?
The Colorado Code of Judicial




indispensable to justice in
our society. A judge should
participate in establishing,
maintaining, and enforcing, and
should himself observe, high
standards of conduct so that
the integrity and independence
of the judiciary may be
preserved. The provisions of
this Code should be construed
and applied to further that
objective. 5
The canons demand that a
judge should avoid impropriety
and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities (Canon
2), that a judge should perform
the duties of his or her office
impartially and diligently (Canon
3), that a judge is encouraged
to participate in extra-judicial
activities that do not detract
from the dignity of the office or
interfere with the performance
of judicial duties (Canon 5), but
that a judge should refrain from
political activity (Canon 7).36
The canons include detailed
proscriptions and prescriptions
for judicial behavior in service of
the general goals. For example, a
judge may not engage in ex parte
communications about a case,
or comment publicly about a
pending or impending case.37
On the other hand, Colorado
has recently amended its Code
of Conduct to clarify that a
judge is encouraged to engage
in activities designed to improve
the administration of justice; and
is also encouraged to participate
in civic and charitable activities,
provided that they do not endanger
the judge's impartiality.38 In short,
at least in Colorado, judges are
expected to engage in overt
efforts to improve our system of
justice. That responsibility could
take the form of attempting to
develop better communications
in a certain locale among schools,
social services, probation, and
religious entities about at-risk
children; or, it could take the form
of attempting to change the way
that the entire system handles
certain types of cases or treats
jurors. Judges sometimes testify
before legislative committees
and often teach, speak to service
groups, or host groups of children
in their courthouses. Judges are,
and should be, educators and
innovators about our system of
justice.
Additionally, judges should
be a part of their communities,
donating their time and efforts
to those communities. Not only
does that effort put the judge
more in touch with community
needs and problems, but it
also puts a human face on the
judiciary so that people are not as
overwhelmed or mystified by it. 3
9
Perhaps most importantly,
judges have a duty to undertake
the job of judging with wisdom,
fairness, efficiency, and clarity.
Trial judges must walk the daily
tightrope of treating individuals
in their courtroom with fairness
and giving them their "day in
court," while still being mindful
of the hundreds of other cases
awaiting court time. Those
judges must remember that each
individual case is about justice
for those parties, and demeanor
of a trial judge in a courtroom is of
critical importance in upholding
the integrity of the system.
Additionally, judges must be case
managers, who make the best
use of in-court time as possible,
and who move cases toward
resolution appropriately. When
judges rule, their decisions should
be clear and understandable, so
that all parties believe that, win
or lose, they were heard and the
decision makes sense.
Similarly, appellate judges
have a duty to write opinions
that are comprehensible for
litigants, lawyers, law students,
law professors, the media, and
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trial judges. That is a diverse
audience-but a realistic one for
an important opinion.
Hence, all of those obligations
accompany judicial independence
from the perspective of a sitting
judge. To continue to earn and
deserve the independence that
the Constitution envisions, those
traits are optimal. Certainly none
of us have them all, but, in general,
Colorado's judiciary is held in high
esteem nationally.
40
The last set of obligations that
come into play once a judge is
appointed fall to other parts of
society. Practicing attorneys and
the organized bar bear some
responsibility to defend and
uphold the judiciary- particularly
when the judiciary cannot speak
for itself, such as on the heels
of issuance of a particularly
controversial opinion that is
mandated by the wording of
a statute or the application of
precedent. In that circumstance,
the judge or the court cannot
offer a defense-but rather risk
being pilloried in the media
unless the bar steps in to defend
the decision. In Colorado, the
Colorado Bar Association has
frequently taken on that role of
supporting a decision or a judge.
The last step in this progression
of interlocking responsibility
falls upon the holder of the
purse strings. To function, the
judiciary must be adequately
funded. The judiciary has no
power to levy taxes, and must
rely upon allocation of general
fund monies. As a constitutional
matter, the legislature bears
the onus of funding the judicial
branch of government.41
Additionally, the courts have an
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affirmative obligation to perform
their constitutional duties and
to protect their independent
status. Consequently, the courts
possess the "inherent power to
determine and compel payment
of those sums of money which
are reasonable and necessary
to carry out its mandated
responsibilities.42 However, "a
court may exercise its inherent
powers only when established
methods for procuring necessary
funds have failed and the
court has determined that the
assistance necessary for the
effective performance of judicial
functions cannot be obtained by
any other means. "
43
Indeed, in order to assure
that funding entities-state
or federal-do not attempt to
punish the judiciary for unpopular
decisions, no sitting judge's salary
can be reduced while he or she is
in office. But, of course, judges'
salaries are just a small portion of
what it takes to run a court system.
Colorado's system currently
consists of approximately 3,000
full-time employees, including
judges. The non-judicial officers
are the ones who file the cases,
carry the probation caseload,
compile the budgets, set up the
technology systems, and manage
to keep the system functioning.
To make the court system one
that deserves the trust and
confidence of the public, we
must constantly be innovative,
responsive to new problems
(such as the increasing need for
translators or for assistance for
litigants who choose not to hire
attorneys), and ever mindful of
our responsibility to provide equal
justice for all. But we cannot do
it without reasonable funding. If
courts are not funded, what do
they stop doing? Perhaps they
stop accepting small claims
cases, or civil cases in general,
or perhaps misdemeanor crimes?
Perhaps probation officers do
not supervise probationers,
and, instead, those individuals
are committed to prison? All
of us can envision a cascade
of unacceptable problems
stemming from any of those
alternatives. The courts are
not a luxury or a government
program that could stand a little
belt-tightening. The courts are a
branch of government, charged
with meeting constitutional
responsibilities. Adequate funding
is not optional; it is mandatory.
Conclusion
An independent and coequal
judicial branch of government is as
critical to our national well-being
as water to drink, air to breathe,
and food to eat. The courts
safeguard not only our individual
liberties, but also public safety,
employment issues, personal
injury recompense, enforcement
of contracts, and a myriad of other
social agreements. As judges, we
are charged with upholding the
dignity and sanctity of our offices.
As a nation, we cannot afford to
undermine the strength of that
branch of government or the
judges who people it.
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